Defense Politics in a Mediterranean City: Medieval Military Threats to Dubrovnik (Ragusa) and Emergent Tensions between Defensive Strategy and Securing Public Order by Fejic, Nenad
307 Imago TemporIs. medIum aevum, iv (2010): 307-328. issn 1888-3931
DEFENSE POLITICS IN A MEDITERRANEAN 
CITY: MEDIEVAL MILITARY THREATS TO 
DUBROVNIK (RAGUSA) AND EMERGENT 
TENSIONS BETWEEN DEFENSIVE STRATEGY 
AND SECURING PUBLIC ORDER
nenAd FeJic
université des Antilles et de lA GuYAne
fRAnce
Date of receipt: 3rd of July, 2009
Final date of acceptance: 4th of November, 2009
abstract 
The author examines the history of the medieval wars of Dubrovnik (Ragusa) in 
two parts: first, he illustrates its active defense against military threats including the 
formation of an urban militia, the recruitment of mercenaries, and the organization 
of a navy, and second, he traces the corollaries of the threat of a foreign enemy and 
the city’s militarized reaction to the deterioration of public order and its effect on 
local social and political cohesion. 
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Up until the end of the Middle Ages, the city of Dubrovnik, situated on the eastern 
coast of the Adriatic sea, progressively expanded its political and economic zone of 
influence far beyond its civic borders.1 When threats arose, the city was forced to 
protect this expansive realm militarily.2 Dubrovnik was situated along a strategic 
maritime route between Venice and the Strait of Otranto behind an archipelago of 
small islands, which protected it against strong winds and ocean currents. It was also 
ideally territorially situated between caravan routes that crossed the Balkans and 
thus reaped the benefits of thriving commerce from both the Eastern and Western 
Mediterranean. The city was unique in the Balkan Peninsula, having achieved cer-
tain elements of modernity by asserting its political independence. Dubrovnik was 
also the only Balkan community to have capitalized on its unique geographical posi-
tion and nurtured the political and economic currents that it encountered as a result 
of its position between Western Christendom and the Ottoman Empire. Archives 
chronicle the depth of local memory and documentation dedicated to this precocious 
modern age relates the exceptionalism of the medieval history of urban Dubrovnik.3 
The Ragusans can offer contemporary historians a mirror of their past from the 
late Middle Ages. There had always been a privileged patrician class among them, 
although they did not occupy a space in a nation-state, as would be the case during 
the birth of Balkan nationalism in the twentieth century.4 Local patricians wielded 
political and economic power and assertively conveyed the image of a peaceful, 
inclusive, and modern urban commune that was open to the territorial states of 
the hinterland such as Serbia, Bosnia, and later, Hungary and the Ottoman Empire. 
1. Abreviations: Drzavni archiv u Dubrovniku (DAD).
2. Two key texts of Ragusan history are cited here. They have been published in French and English, 
respectively, but many more citations are possible: Krekic, Barisa. Dubrovnik (Raguse) et le Levant. Paris: 
École Pratique des Hautes Études, 1961; Krekic, Barisa. Dubrovnik in the 14th and the 15th centur: A city 
between East end West. Oklahoma: University of Oklahoma Press, 1962. 
3. The four most notable Ragusan historians include Jakov Lukarevic, (Giacomo Lucari), author of the 
well-known chronicle, Copioso ristretto degli annali di Ragusa, (Luccari, Giacomo. Copioso ristretto de gli an-
nali di Ragusa. Venice: Antonio Leonardi, 1605) Mavro Orbin (Mauro Orbini) author of one of the most 
remarkable histories of the Slavic people, Il Regno delli Slavi, (Orbini. Mauro. Il regno degli slavi: hoggi. 
Corrottamente detti schiauoni. Pesaro: G. Concordia, 1601), Junije Restic (Junius Restii),1669-1735, author 
of a history of Dubrovnik up until 1451, Chronica Ragusina Junii Restii, ab origine urbis usque ad annum 
1451, item Joannis Gundulae (1451-1484), (Restii Junius. Chronica Ragusina junii Restii, ab origine urbis usque 
ad annum 1451. ietm Joannis Gundulae 1451-1484, eds. Natko Nodilo, Junije-Dzono Antunov Rastic, Ivan 
Marinov Gundulié. Zagreb: ex officina Societatis Typographicae, 1893), et Nicolas Ragnina, who offered 
an addendum to an anonymous Ragusan work of history, the Annales Ragusini Anonymi item Nicolai de 
Ragnina, ed. Natko Nodilo. Zagreb: Ex officina Societatis Typographicae, 1883. 
4. Braudel, Fernand. La Méditerranée et le monde méditerranéen à l’époque de Philippe II. Paris: Armand 
Colin, 1949: II, 1113: Elles offrent à qui aurait la patience et le temps de parcourir les volumineux Acta consilio-
rum, l’occasion de surprendre en pleine action une ville médiévale encore, étrangement sauvegardée. Elles offrent 
aussi, conservés pour des raisons d’enregistrement ou de discussions de justice, d’extraordinaires documents, lettres de 
change, notes, assurances maritimes, règlements de participation, fondations de sociétés, successions, engagements de 
domestiques .... (They offer to those who have the patiente and the time to go through the voluminous, 
Acata consiliorum, the chance to catch in action a medieval town still strangely safeguarded. They offer 
also extraordinary documents, exchange letters, notes, maritime insurances participation rules, founda-
tions of societies, inheritances, contracts of servants preserved for reasons of having been recorded of 
forming part of legal discussions...). 
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These powerful individuals also conveyed their sense of respect for Dubrovnik’s 
powerful maritime partners as well as rivals —the states of Venice and Genoa. 
Contemporary historians have commonly viewed medieval Dubrovnik as a city 
whose wealth was based on a maritime merchant class, rather than an elite warrior 
class. This impression is compounded when assessing the city’s fate as it sparred 
with its eternal Adriatic rival, Venice during the Napoleonic conquests of the nine-
teenth century. While it is indisputable that Dubrovnik’s ruling elites were more 
concerned with dominating commercial shipping than engaging in foreign conflict 
and Dubrovnik largely averted major engagements in warfare, during the last three 
centuries of the Middle Ages, Dubrovnik was a site of numerous military clashes 
which on several occasions threatened its very survival as a city-state. 
Wars were perceived as threats to political and governmental freedom, but more 
importantly as threats to the economy. As navigation was restricted in times of 
war, the citizens of Dubrovnik interpreted military challenges as a call for the total 
mobilization of the urban body. However, once hostilities ceased and commercial 
relations resumed, period histories glorified the efforts of elite Ragusans, rather than 
the sacrifices and labors of the civic collective. Thus, what was committed to histori-
cal memory was in many ways a myth. It is therefore not surprising that, even in 
contemporary history, the Ragusan elites have been studied as major stakeholders 
in the wars between medieval states that successively struck the Adriatic between 
Dubrovnik, Serbia, and Bosnia, as well as other occasional rivals, Venice and Genoa. 
In times of war, whatever enemy or danger loomed, the main concern of the 
authorities was to secure the urban zone and central districts, after which efforts 
were immediately made to cease hostilities and restore trade, reopen ports, and 
resume freedom of movement in the Adriatic. War typically provoked a series of 
logistical measures designed to ensure the adequate mobilization of the defensive 
forces, the protection of the urban perimeter, and the assurance of internal peace 
and order, with the ultimate aim of a rapid and successful conclusion of hostilities. 
Measures to consolidate defense forces and guarantee public order are recorded in 
Dubrovnik’s medieval political, economic, and judicial archives, and relate the work 
of elites as well as commoners in these military operations. Many policy measures 
were enacted long before the outbreak of conflicts. City councils passed preemptive 
security measures and policy plans for ceasing wars in progress and restoring order 
before any hazards were made manifest. A study of military safety measures in 
medieval Dubrovnik must therefore not only include sources from times of conflict, 
but also those from times of peace. Defensive military strategies were voted on and 
applied to avoid potential future dangers that threatened Dubrovnik, as well as the 
territory beyond. Approved policies reveal the extent of the perceived threats feared 
by medieval Ragusans, as well as the élites’ dedication to extensive diplomatic 
exchange with foreign powers.
At the height of its expansion, medieval Dubrovnik was comprised of a coastal 
strip of just eighty kilometers long and a maximum of ten kilometers wide. It reached 
from the estuary of the Neretva River and the peninsula of Peljesac (Sabioncello) to 
the Bay of Kotor (Cattaro). However, the municipality of Dubrovnik could not pro-
vide sanctuary for the entirety of the population occupying the territory in times of 
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war.5 It is precisely this reality of a population’s search for shelter and security that 
was foremost on the minds of Dubrovnik’s maritime merchants when deciding its 
politics of prudence, diplomacy, and pacifism. The population’s origins in the former 
colony of Epidaurus (now Cavtat) and the Slavic invasions in the sixth and seventh 
centuries formed the military mindset of the community that had to make difficult 
decisions regarding its political reality. 
Unlike Venice, Dubrovnik’s geopolitical situation did not change significantly in 
the Middle Ages. Its territorial enlargement could not compare to that of Venice, 
even if one includes the small islands of Elafiten, Mljet (Melitta), and Lastavo 
(Lagosta), who were far from the Adriatic coast and only reluctantly submitted to 
the authority of Dubrovnik. Dubrovnik’s size thus rendered any bellicose overtures 
on its part unlikely. Some historians have expressed admiration for Dubrovnik’s 
exceptional resistance in a hostile environment, especially after the Ottoman 
conquest of the Balkans where the Ragusans expressed recalcitrance at the offer 
of a status as a city-state. Unfortunately, this line of reasoning can be equated 
with the mythologizing of Ragusan self-determination and is without substance. 
There was no interruption in the exercise of foreign sovereign power over the city. 
Indeed, Dubrovnik recognized several foreign authorities throughout medieval and 
modern history, including the Byzantine Emperor until the late eleventh century, 
then briefly the Normans of Southern Italy between 1081 and 1085. Later, during 
the wars of Robert Guiscard against Byzantine Albania. Later, Dubrovnik came 
under Byzantine rule throughout the twelfth century, except during the years of 
the Norman offensive against Byzantium in the period of Andronicus I Comnenus. 
During the period of the Byzantine Dynasty of Angels, the city returned to the 
Byzantine fold and remained there until the Fourth Crusade when it fell under the 
authority of Venice. It conclusively rejected the authority of Serenissima in 1358 in 
order to recognize the Kingdom of Hungary under Louis I of Anjou. From 1458 on-
ward, the suzerainty of Hungary was parallel to the suzerainty of the Ottoman Em-
pire in Dubrovnik. This was recognized by the regular payment of annual tribute. 
The recognition of Hungarian authority came to a close in 1526 with the collapse of 
the kingdom due to the Turkish invasions. 
Before further discussing strategies of Dubrovnik’s defense, it is necessary to 
examine the wars in which the Ragusans found themselves engaged between the 
twelfth and fifteenth centuries. Although there were a large number of armed con-
flicts, there are numerous gaps in the historiography, largely because of the uneven 
condition and preservation of sources.6 Despite this, can a typology of the wars 
5. At the time of its greatest expansion in the fifteenth century, the population of the city intra muros was 
between five and six thousand. An estimate of the population of the entire district is more vague, but is 
likely to have been between twenty and twenty-five thousand inhabitants.
6. Since the close of the twelfth century, the following wars have been documented in history (in 
chronological order): The war against the Serbian Prince Stéphane Némania (1184-1185), the war 
against King Stéphane Vladislav (1234), two wars against King Stéphane Ouros I (1252-1254 and 1266-
1268), two wars against King Stéphane Ouros II Miloutine (1301-1302 and 1317-1318), the war with 
King Stéphane Ouros III (1327-1328), the “War of Zara” against the Genovese on the coast of Venice 
(1351-1355), the War of Chioggia (Ténédos) (1378-1381) against Venice on the coast of Genoa and in 
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of Dubrovnik be drawn for the last three centuries of the Middle Ages? It can be 
said with some certainty that in this period, three distinct periods can be perceived 
which correspond to three types of wars in which the city-state engaged. 
The first “type” of war dates from the late twelfth century until the first third of 
the fourteenth century, a period in which the city was the victim of frequent at-
tacks, first by the Serbian Prince Stefan Nemania (the Grand Zupan), and later by 
his descendents the kings of the Nemanide Dynasty. From the perspective of the 
Serbian monarchs whose lands comprised the hinterland near Dubrovnik, military 
engagements with Dubrovnik were simply part of military campaigns against other 
rival powers such as the Normans and the Venetians. With the exceptions of the first 
conflict with Prince Stefan Namania in the late twelfth century and the conflict with 
the Serbian-controlled city of Kotor in the early fourteenth century, all conflicts 
with Serbia in this early period took place in Dubrovnik’s immediate hinterland. 
The end of the first period is marked by Emperor Stefan Dusan’s policies of expan-
sion against Byzantium between 1331 and 1355. Unlike his predecessors, this Ser-
bian king, and later emperor pursued policies of diplomacy and respect toward the 
small adriatic city-state. He ceded the great peninsula of Peljesac (Sabioncello) in 
1333, which became host to the permanent garrison of Dubrovnik which defended 
the northern boundaries of the district. 
The second period corresponds to the major conflict between Venice and Genoa 
during the second half of the fourteenth century. Dubrovnik involved itself in the 
Wars of Zadar (Zara) between 1350 and 1355, and Chioggia (the War of Tenedos) 
between 1378 and 1381. In the same period Dubrovnik saw the gradual weakening 
of the authority of Serbia after the death of the Emperor Stefan Dusan in 1355 and 
the subsequent death of his son, Stefan Ouros in 1371, who was the last of the Nema-
nide Dynasty. This development encouraged the emergence of a number of lords who 
only barely recognized the authority of the last Nemanide king and sought to assert 
themselves as strong partners, sponsors, or opponents of Dubrovnik. However, these 
men were too weak and disorganized to threaten the existence of the commune. 
The third period encompasses the late fourteenth century as well as the 
fifteenth century, during which military campaigns against Dubrovnik (although 
less frequent) were more seriously threatening. This period corresponds to the 
weakening of the Hungarian suzerainty which was beset by feudal anarchic discord 
between the death of Louis I in 1382 and the reign of Sigismund of Luxembourg 
beginning in 1387. This period of conflict resulted in the decline of the Kingdom of 
Bosnia after the death of Tvrtko I in 1391. The kingdom’s deterioration was marked 
by the interference of Ottoman governors who incited conflict among the Bosnian 
lords or between the Bosnian lords and the city of Dubrovnik, particularly between 
1430 and 1432 and between 1451 and 1454. The Ottomans intent was to convince 
the citizenry of Dubrovnik to understand the extent of their vulnerability and force 
Hungary, the war against the Serbian Lord Vojislav Vojinovic (1359-1362), the war against his nephew 
Nicolas Altomanovic (1370-1371), the war against the Bosnian King Stéphane Ostoja (1403-1404), the 
war against the Bosnian Lord Radoslav Pavlovic (1430-1432), and the war against the Bosnian Lord 
Stéphane Vuktchitch Kossatcha (1451-1454).
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it to seek the arbitration and protection of the Ottoman sultan. Thus, this period 
is marked by the slow but marked rise of Ottoman power in the Balkans whose 
presence was perceived as threatening to Dubrovnik’s borders and autonomy. 
Historians cannot present the narrative of the defense of Dubrovnik in this 
period without discussing both military strategy and means of self-governance. 
Active military protection measures included the mass mobilization of local and 
foreign allies, the recruitment of mercenaries, and the purchase, acquisition, and 
stockpiling of weaponry. Passive defensive strategies included the construction of 
defensive architecture, including bridges, ditches, forts, and pillars. Just as essential, 
however, were the means of administration in this period, which was designed in 
order to secure public order. Security was guaranteed through surveillance, swift 
criminal justice, and the conciliation of powerful or potential foes, who could have 
been solicited by enemy republics or powers to betray the city. 
1. Active military protection 
1.1 Combat units in Dubrovnik’s wars
Unlike most Italian communes of the same period, and despite the fact that there 
was considerable economic exchange and growth throughout the region during the 
twelfth century, Dubrovnik’s economic growth can be seen as unique in that the 
development of its crafts and commercial products grew in tandem with its military 
strategy. What drove professionalization of functions and crafts in this period 
also seems to have driven defensive military strategy. While it is known that the 
militias, foot soldiers, artillery forces, the navy, and other military squadrons were 
comprised of everyday civilians from across the social and professional spectrum, 
little documentation exists to categorize what activities or sectors these individuals 
were involved in prior to combat. Sources have demonstrated, however, distinctions 
between combat units as well as the difference in assignments given to people of the 
district from those given to other residents of the city. Mercenaries in the service 
of Dubrovnik were recruited from both coasts of the Adriatic and became more 
commonplace in the late fourteenth century. These individuals played a key role in 
fighting during the first half of the fifteenth century. Command of the three principle 
combat units —the navy, the local militias, and mercenaries— was the duty of the 
patricians. These patricians were members of the three councils of government and 
were responsible for the execution of military operations in wartime.
1.2 The militia
Major combat units were recruited from the population of the city and the dis-
trict. Knowledge of the origins, recruitment, and chains of command of the Du-
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brovnik militia has increased over the centuries, thanks in large part to documen-
tary sources from the thirteenth century, particularly those chronicling the third of 
the last three wars in Dubrovnik.
The earliest evidence detailing the Ragusan militia dates from the twelfth cen-
tury. In 1184 and 1185, the city was besieged by the troops of the Serbian prince 
Stefan Namania.7 In 1185, according to an anonymous Ragusan chronicler, the Ser-
bian army of thirty thousand cavalry (or fifty thousand men according to a different 
account) laid siege to Dubrovnik. The assault ended in failure for the Serbian army 
as the Ragusan militia launched counteroffensives aimed at burning the war ma-
chines that the attackers had laid at the foot of the city walls. Testimonies from 
this attack reveal both the military activity of the Dubrovnik militia, as well as the 
important fact that the fortifications and the organizing system around which city 
defense was established were constantly in a state of amelioration and technological 
improvement. Dubrovnik’s defensive strategies became more capable and techni-
cally sophisticated until the end of the Middle Ages. 
The urban perimeter of Dubrovnik could accommodate both a standing army 
and a large proportion of the citizenry seeking refuge from attack. Throughout the 
thirteenth and early fourteenth century, the forces of the Serbian kings attacked 
Dubrovnik’s exterior zones. The local militia often repelled such attacks success-
fully in this area. Only in the fifteenth century did warfare take place within the 
district zone of Dubrovnik. For instance, in 1252 when the grandson of the dynastic 
leader Stefan Ouros I led his troops to attack Dubrovnik, the cavalry, foot soldiers, 
and machines of war never reached the city center as Dubrovnik’s leaders settled 
with the Serbian king diplomatically.8 Furthermore, despite the rise in the power 
of Dubrovnik’s militia throughout the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries, the city 
avoided open conflict and extensive military confrontation whenever possible. Only 
in the fifteenth century with the incorporation of experienced units of Italian mer-
cenaries did Dubrovnik engage in open campaigns against the Bosnian and Serbian 
rulers. 
When the Bosnian prince Tvrtko I surrounded Dubrovnik’s city walls in 1367, 
the militia was ordered to secure the perimeter and remain on the defensive within 
the walls, but also to make all attempts to prevent the invading army from capturing 
the livestock that was grazing outside.9 
This relative reluctance of the militia to fight outside the walls changed dramatically 
in the fifteenth century, however. More active military recruitment within Dubrovnik 
and the inclusion of Italian and Albanian mercenaries resulted in a more seasoned, 
capable, and bellicose fighting force. The exact numbers of the Ragusan militia vary 
according to different documentation. Moreover, as with accounts of the first conflict 
with the Serbian prince Stefan Nemania, recorded numbers of troops or cavalry 
7. Chronica Ragusina Junii Restii...: 60; Annales Ragusini Anonymi item Nicolai de Ragnina...: 218.
8. Chronica Ragusina Junii Restii...: 90.
9. Monumenta Ragusina: libri reformationum. IV, ann. 1364-1396, ed. Josephus Gelcich. Zagreb: Academia 
scientiarum et artium slavorum meridionalim, 1896: 92. 
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can vary widely. What is known thanks to contemporary demographic analysis 
is that at its apogee of population expansion in the fifteenth century, Dubrovnik 
contained between five and six thousand inhabitants.10 Still, there are considerable 
discrepancies among the fifteenth-century sources (until recently historians’ sole 
sources on demography) on issues regarding militia strength, battlefield chronicles, 
and government recruitment of soldiers.11 In the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries, 
the Senate and Lower Council of Dubrovnik conducted censuses in order to assess 
the proportion of the population available for recruitment into the militia. In 1323, 
the government claimed to have identified all Ragusans between the ages of 15 and 
70, assigned them to twelve battalions with commanding officers, and had them 
trained for combat.12 The census was repeated in 1357, 1428, and 1430, each time 
with the intention of organizing military strategy.
The census of 1428 saw the formation of three patrician collectives who took 
charge of registering the names of all able-bodied men between the ages of 16 and 
65. These patrician leaders also recorded the number of women in the city, an im-
portant facet of understanding the general population’s growth and its potential for 
future mobilization.13 
The 1430 census is exemplary for its precision. As part of its implementation, the 
Dubrovnik Senate instructed the principle leader of the Lower Council to conduct 
a “comprehensive” census of all residents of the city, including men, women, chil-
dren, and the elderly. The Senate also mandated a record of each individual’s social 
condition so that it would be made aware of the percentage of the population capa-
ble of bearing arms.14 Truly unfortunately, the results of the censuses are nowhere 
to be found in the archives. In order to know the proportion of the population 
included in militia formation, historians must look to deployment orders and other 
documents related to the securing of the city in specific moments. Deployment or-
ders were not exclusively utilized in wartime. Evidence suggests that military or-
ganization and preparation was a sustained activity in times of peace and periods of 
openness and widespread economic activity.
The ring road surrounding the city walls stretched almost two kilometers and 
included the fortifications along the port, the arsenal, and the forts in the northwest 
and southeast. The St. Lawrence and Revelin forts were constantly guarded by two 
detachments of the urban militia who numbered between six and fifty depending 
on the circumstances. Detachment duty was split between day and night shifts, 
10. Krivosic, Stjepan. Stanovnistvo Dubrovnika i demografske promjene u proslosti (La population de Dubrovnik 
et les changements démographiques dans le passé). Dubrovnik: JAZU, 1990.
11. The oldest registers chronicling the decisions of the government councils of Dubrovnik cite the High 
Council, (Consilium Maius) Lower Council (Consilium Minus) and the Senate (consilium Rogatorum). 
The registers date from 1301 and detail (with few interruptions) the history of governance throughout 
the entirety of the Middle Ages. These registers are today held in the State Archives in Dubrovnik (Drza-
vni arhiv u Dubrovniku), and are available for historians to use.
12. Chronica Ragusina junii Restii...: 113.
13. DAD. Consilium Minus, IV, f. 200.
14. DAD. Consilum Rogatorum, IV, f. 136’-137’.
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and each shift was marked by rigorous discipline towards guarding the forts. Any 
evidence of desertion, neglect, or insubordination while on duty was punished by 
imprisonment and heavy fines. The hierarchy of military organization was as fol-
lows: captains (capitanei), who were also patricians, formed the elite; members of 
the High Council (nobili) administered the ranks; and militia fighters were formed 
from the ordinary citizenry (homini). 
Clearly, in extraordinary circumstances, the military detachments were not 
large enough to confront the direct external threat. A larger recruitment pool and 
a strong chain of command were essential. Records indicate that a number of bat-
talions employed during the wars in Dubrovnik did not come from populations 
recorded in the city census. In response to the 1301 battle against the Serbian King 
Stefan Miloutine, the city recruited 300 persons capable of bearing arms and sent 
them to the outer territory to “protect the city’s vines”.15 In 1378 during the War 
of Chioggia (Tenedos) the Ragusans, fearing a Venetian attack on city, recruited 
roughly one thousand individuals from the surrounding areas, but it was not suf-
ficient for its purposes. 
Who controlled the Dubrovnik militia? Small detachments were certainly de-
ployed by the patricians in times of war as well as peace. However, the broader chain 
of command was more complex. At the highest level, the oligarchic High Council, as 
well as the Senate and made decisions concerning war and peace in Dubrovnik. The 
leader of the Councils was the central principal of government and was elected for a 
term of one month, without the possibility of renewal. The High Council was com-
prised of the most influential members of the patrician class, and engaged in little to 
no military activity directly. The Senate consisted of forty men who focused on the 
management of international relations and diplomatic affairs. The Lower Council 
and its principal met most often during times of war, acting frequently in complete 
concert with each other to effectively respond to the fluctuating circumstances of 
battles and conflicts. In certain moments, the tasks of command and logistics in war-
time proved too heavy for the three ruling bodies of the government of Dubrovnik. 
In these times, between two and five “War Counselors” or “High Generals of War” 
(savii sapientes capitanei) were appointed by the Councils or its principal in order 
to effectively manage the high degree of mobilization required. 
1.3 Mercenary units serving Dubrovnik
Unlike most cities and towns in Italy, Dubrovnik only rarely used mercenary 
forces. They were incorporated into the military structure of the city only in the fif-
teenth century —a relatively late moment in the Middle Ages. Mercenaries proved 
more effective in the city’s offensives against the feudal lords of Dubrovnik’s hin-
terland, rather than in battles against the great power of the era— the Ottomans. 
15. Monumenta Ragusina: libri reformationum. V, ann. 1301-1336, ed. Josephus Gelcich. Zagreb: Academia 
scientiarum et artium slavorum meridionalim, 1897: 1.
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The late integration of mercenaries is explained by their high cost and the fact that 
such costs were only possible when Dubrovnik reached the pinnacle of its economic 
power in the fifteenth century. Their commitment to Dubrovnik was crucial in the 
campaigns against the Bosnian lords where domestic or local foot soldiers would 
have been insufficient. 
The first records depicting mercenaries in the employ of the city date from the 
early fourteenth century (1301) and relate the recruitment of eight technically 
skilled catapult engineers and operators from Castile who were paid a modest wage 
of two and a half ducats per month.16 During the War of Tenedos between Genoa 
and Venice, Dubrovnik sent envoys to its ally, Genoa, to recruit loyal and skillful 
catapult engineers who were “above reproach” for “the best price possible.”17 Two 
decades later, during a difficult and prolonged war against the Bosnian King Stefan 
Ostoja, the Council of Dubrovnik recruited from among the larger Balkan popula-
tion. They approached local potentates from Montenegro and Albania, as well as 
lieutenants of the Ottoman sultan in Albania, for their assistance in the recruit-
ment of soldiers. As part of their greater incorporation of mercenary forces, new 
terminology was employed to distinguish the contingents of local militia from Du-
brovnik. The nomenclature of “soldatesca” or “veterani” thus came into common 
parlance in the fourteenth century.18 
The high period of mercenary intervention in Dubrovnik coincided with two 
wars against the Bosnian princes. Bosnia had sought (and attained) the support of 
the Ottoman Sultan Murad II in their campaigns led by Radoslav Pavlovic between 
1430 and 1432, and later by Stefan Vuktchitich between 1451 and 1455. In both 
wars, the role of Albanian and later, Italian mercenaries was significant. Official city 
registers reveal their high numbers and the degree to which they cooperated (or 
failed to integrate) with the contingents of local Dubrovnik militia. 
Some conclusions regarding mercenaries emerge from the Council records. First, 
mercenary response was recorded as punctual and dependable during the wars of 
the fifteenth century. They mercenaries were recruited on the eve of a scheduled 
battle and did not typically remain in the city once their services had been rendered 
—leaving Dubrovnik with their remuneration when the conflict ceased. Secondly, 
mercenaries comprised only a minority position among militia fighters and while 
they cooperated with and were supervised by local Ragusans, did not normally in-
tegrate themselves into their units or with the local population. Also, local Ragusan 
sources confirm that these mercenaires were likely to constitute cavalry forces and 
archers often armed with spears. These men were known as the “stratiotes” and 
were often solicited by the Venetians in the fifteenth century in their campaigns 
16. Monumenta Ragusiana: libri reformatiuonum. V...: 7.
17. Monumenta Ragusiana: libri reformatiuonum. IV...: 251.
18. The recruitment and deployment of mercenaries was a time-consuming process, which gave a stra-
tegic advantage to the aggressor at the opening of hostilities or the outbreak of conflict. However, in 
the long term, and certainly at the beginning of the fifteenth century, the Ragusans managed to turn 
circumstances to their military advantage and succeeded in re-establishing the status quo that existed 
prior to the conflict.
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against the Ottomans in Dalmatia and Venetian Albania. Thirdly, contrary to Vene-
tian practice, these mercenaries took were not independent as they were in Italy, 
and their orders from the commanders of the Ragusan militias which proved dis-
astrous in the conflicts between the city and the Bosnian lords between 1430 and 
1432 and again between 1451 and 1454. Lastly, while these mercenaries were a 
minority force, they often proved crucial to determining the outcome of battles and 
guaranteed victory for Dubrovnik at several key moments. 
What is unique in the history of mercenaries is historians’ access to a greater 
number of sources, including some intimate chronicles of mercenaries, their ac-
counts of battle victories and (more or less dependable) tales of glory and triumph 
over adversaries. In the first war against the Bosnian Duke Radoslav Pavlovic 
between 1430 and 1432, the Senate sent a small force of mercenaries from Albania 
with a mission to inflict the greatest possible amount of damage on the enemy ter-
ritory. One document states, “The mercenaries, in the employ of a determined na-
tion, performed their task with great success and looted, burned, and devastated the 
entire region they traversed”.19 After this, however, came a more negative account: 
The Albanian irregulars, unaccustomed to discipline and seeing the prudence with 
which we advanced...and believing they would be deprived of booty, mutinied...
They broke from the contingent and scattered. The Bosnian Duke seized the op-
portunity and fell upon them with all his might. They would have all been killed 
if the Ragusan commandant had not come to their rescue.20
Similarly, Dubrovnik hired four hundred Italian mercenaries in the campaign 
against Duke Stefan Vuktchitch Kossatcha between 1451 and 1454. These men 
were recruited from the lands of the wealthy Italian lords Frederic d’Urbino and 
Sigismond Malatesta de Rimini. Although Dubrovnik hoped for a high degree of 
military response by including these mercenaries, their expectations were not met. 
The Ragusan captains controlled an inexperienced local militia, and alongside these 
soldiers, the Italian mercenaries had little ability to demonstrate their effectiveness. 
They were barely able to save the contingent during a battle in 1451 when the 
Bosnian Duke’s army completely encircled them and practically annihilated the 
entire force.21 These sources beg the question: to what degree were hired merce-
naries trustworthy? In the chronicles of Dubrovnik, there exists an allusion to a 
conspiracy among mercenaries during the war between 1451-1455. One reference 
posits, “there is a plot... to put the city in the hands of a foreign prince,” the “prince” 
referenced clearly being Bosnia’s Stefan Vuktchitich Kosatcha. 
All in all, the mercenaries served almost exclusively in Dubrovnik’s later wars, and 
proved overall to be more effective in battle than the local militia, although there are 
19. Chronica Ragusina Junii Restii...: 235.
20. Chronica Ragusina Junii Restii...: 236.
21. Cirkovic, Sima. “Vesti Brolja de Lavelo kao izvor za istoriju Bosne i Dubrovnika” (“Les renseigne-
ments de Broglio de Lavello en tant que sources pour l’histoire de la Bosnie et de Dubrovnik”). Istorijski 
casopis, 12/13 (1961-1962): 167-187.
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exceptions. They certainly contributed to the safeguarding of Dubrovnik’s freedom 
during the period of successive encroachment by the Bosnian kings. As their surround-
ing Balkan rivals became subjects of the Ottoman sultan by the late fifteenth century, 
Dubrovnik found itself in later centuries alone in front of the powerful empire. 
1.4 The Dubrovnik arms
Assuring the supply of weaponry was a primary concern of the Dubrovnik 
government throughout the Middle Ages. During periods of prolonged armed 
conflict against the Serbian and Bosnian kings in the thirteenth and fourteenth 
centuries, as well as the wars against Genoa and Venice in the fourteenth century 
and the Bosnian lords in the fifteenth century, the government took extraordinary 
measures to rearm the population. 
The funds earmarked for rearmament were enormous, drawn from all available 
income in the city. Revenue was also acquired through levies on salt, wheat, and 
wine, sold by the town to individuals. There were also export taxes on precious 
metals and import taxes on goods brought into the city, notably wool. Dubrovnik 
manufactured most if its weaponry and imported other parts or arms from its allies. 
The local militias engaged in war on foot, unlike the Italian and Albanian mercenar-
ies who came to Dubrovnik’s service already armed with advanced weaponry. The 
militia was most successful when it could launch defensive attacks from the ram-
parts and from within the city walls and prevent a breach of the perimeter. Once the 
militia was drawn to fight in the open countryside, it often found itself outmatched. 
The orders placed for weaponry by the government reflect this preference for de-
fensive strategy. 
Thus, at the beginning of the War of Tenedos in 1378, Dubrovnik, along with 
its Genovese allies, ordered two hundred sets of armor, two hundred helmets, four 
hundred breastplates, and one hundred pounds of rope for the catapults.22 During 
the war with the Bosnian Duke Stefan Vuktchitch, the city hired local craftsmen to 
produce twenty small bombardment projectiles weighing five pounds each, and ten 
medium projectiles of twenty pounds each.23 They also ordered two hundred small-
caliber firearms and ten large caliber arms known as “pouchkoni”.24
By 1461, Dubrovnik was clearly feeling the Ottoman threat and commissioned 
a Florentine engineer, Master Massa, to design five large bombardment projectiles. 
These were to be placed along the ramparts of the city walls and were given the 
names “The Fury,” “City Salute,” “Well-Armed,” “Saint Blaise” (the city’s patron 
saint), and “Victory.” However, the gunpowder used to launch the bombs was 
poorly secured, and twice the city experienced accidental explosions, including 
22. Monumenta. Ragusina: libri reformationum. IV...: 176.
23. DAD. Consilium Minus, XIII, f. 48. 
24. This refers to a firearm or a kind of arquebus or 20 to 25 millimeter hook gun. It was often used as a 
weapon of support in strengthening the defense of the parapet.
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once during a battle with the Ottomans in August of 1463, which destroyed 
several buildings, damaged the Council Principal’s palace, and killed several 
dozen people, including prominent Council members and the Principal, himself. 
The city government actively encouraged (and later forced) mass participation 
in war preparations. From the middle of the fourteenth century, government 
registries recorded the participants of the “Palia,” which was largely a competition 
where battle skills and war machine engineering were put on display, which 
culminated in the awarding of honors and distinctions to the winners. In 1383, 
the government confirmed by legislative decree that the bi-annual Palia had 
resulted in a greater number of competent and experienced catapult operators 
and archers. 
The government thus concerned itself with the management of arms and 
weaponry, the strict control of its import and export, and the maintenance of the 
good condition of the stockpiles. Regularized reviews and repairs of weapon stocks 
were instituted later in the Middle Ages, and demanded strict oversight. Each 
helmet, breastplate, collar, spear, shield, arrow, catapult, bombs, and gunpowder 
were carefully numbered and inventoried. These stockpiles had to be guarded 
from enemies as well as from ordinary citizens of the city. During the war against 
the Bosnian Duke Stefan Vuktchitch Kossatcha, a Dubrovnik patrician was 
commissioned by the High Council to control imports and exports of arms, and he 
developed strict accounting policies and mechanisms by which to measure entries 
and exits of weaponry belonging to the commune.25 
1.5 The Dubrovnik navy
Fernand Braudel first illuminated the history of the Ragusan navy when he 
brought to light the supreme navigability of Dubrovnik’s ships in the sixteenth 
century that expanded Mediterranean commerce. Ragusan ships crossed the 
Mediterranean and traveled beyond the Straights of Gibraltar. But unlike its rivals 
in Venice, the ragusans ships were rarely engaged in wars. Venice went to serious 
lengths in an attempt to limit the power of the Dubrovnik merchant marine. 
However, the evolution of the Adriatic political economy led Venice to modify its 
uncompromising attitude towards Dubrovnik, particularly during the maritime 
conflict against Genoa, known as the “War of Zadar” which took place between 
1351 and 1355. 
Even in 1346, when Dubrovnik was still under the suzerainty of Venice, Venice 
demanded that the city send an armed envoy to assist in the re-conquest of city of 
Zadar, which had defected to the King of Hungary. According to Ragusan chroni-
cles, “Dubrovnik wished the very opposite of victory for Venice, but nonetheless 
sent an envoy comprised of a patrician captain and a large contingent of armed 
25. DAD. Consilium Maius, X, f. 31-32.
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soldiers to strengthen their forces”.26 Dubrovnik’s maritime dominance increased 
radically after 1358, when Venice relinquished its control of the city and recog-
nized the power of the Kingdom of Hungary. From the second half of the four-
teenth century fortune favored Dubrovnik maritime commerce. The Hungarian 
power was less competitive and repressive than Venice had been, and allowed the 
expansion of new trade. 
The Hungarian monarchy established its suzerainty over Dubrovnik through the 
Treaty of Vissegrad in 1358, which formally required the municipality to provide 
an armed and equipped army contingent in case of maritime war. Following this 
treaty, however, free trade expanded substantially and Dubrovnik was given access 
to mining concessions in the Balkans, which allowed for the increased use of its 
ports and an increased role in international commerce in the late fourteenth and 
fifteenth centuries. No longer content to control just parts of the Adriatic, Ragusan 
merchants extended their commercial reach to the far corners of the Mediterra-
nean. This expansion, however, made their ships vulnerable to pirate attacks. This 
prompted Dubrovnik to create a marine power that could police the seas, particu-
larly along the coastlines between the Peljesac Peninsula in the north and the Bay 
of Kotor in the south, as well as the Apulian Coast. 
The armament and command of commercial security forces was only possible 
in peacetime. At moments where, for instance, Dubrovnik was summoned to send 
reinforcements to Hungary or Genoa, it was forced to sacrifice commercial maritime 
security for a greater cause. It was during the War of Zadar, however, when Du-
brovnik’s interests were directly threatened. During this time, Dubrovnik took the 
opportunity to reinforce its city walls and ramparts and invest in its arsenal. It also 
increased the presence of armed ships in the Adriatic, not wanting to be surprised 
by its rival, Venice. Dubrovnik also sought to join its naval forces with Genoa in the 
Adriatic. Over the course of the war, Dubrovnik supplied Genoa with men, arms, 
and ships. Nevertheless, its assistance did not prove decisive in the War of Chioggia, 
as Venice enjoyed the final victory. 
Dubrovnik was cautious during this war and demonstrated a lack of zeal in its 
battles with the Venetian forces, which exasperated their Genoese allies. Strained 
and repeated negotiations took place over the course of the war which consisted of 
Genoese demands for Ragusan naval forces to fortify its army against Venice, and 
Ragusan demands that Genoa supply ships and guards to defend the now vulnerable 
city of Dubrovnik in the event of a Venetian attack. In the end, Dubrovnik’s de-
fenses improved over the course of the War of Chioggia as its structures and arsenal 
were heavily reinforced. 
Dubrovnik’s general policy regarding maritime warfare privileged the protection 
of maritime trade and avoiding wherever possible the commitment of the navy in 
foreign military operations. Dubrovnik employed a policy of committing the abso-
lute minimum number of ships and soldiers to its allies so that commercial networks 
would not be compromised. This explains why Dubrovnik never attained an im-
26. Chronica Ragusina Junii Restii...: 131.
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portant military success throughout medieval history, despite the high quality of its 
navy and its military capabilities. 
2. Passive military engagement
2.1 The city walls
As the district of Dubrovnik expanded and nearly tripled in size, the area of the 
city walls remained unchanged until the Late Middle Ages. All construction efforts 
were dedicated to better protecting the urban zone, rather than ensuring the greater 
inclusion of the city’s total population within the ramparts. 
The structure of the walls did improve over several centuries, however, and walls 
were made higher with wider trenches, and denser towers. Still, government re-
cords indicate concerns increased over the ability of the structure to protect the 
home population as well as the population of the district’s islands. Anxieties over 
the city’s defense can be explained by the rise of new, more threatening, and more 
intransigent enemies in the local vicinity. The Ottomans prevailed in 1463, ending 
the medieval Kingdom of Bosnia and surrounding the city of Dubrovnik. Protection 
of the city remained paramount throughout the Ottoman period. 
Passive defense consisted of a continuous process of construction and repair of 
the city walls as well as large buildings in its interior in the immediate vicinity of the 
walls. Knowledge of the construction of the urban space is crucial for understanding 
the history of Dubrovnik’s defense. Indeed, the walls formed a rough pentagon with 
three walls facing the sea, and two facing the hinterland. Like Venice, Dubrovnik was 
divided into six districts (known as sesterces), five of which occupied the great rock 
known as “Laus” which protruded from the shore. Only one district extended to the 
foothills of Mount Srdj. At some distance from the city walls the Ragusans built two 
forts between the fourteenth and the sixteenth centuries —St. Laurence (Lovrijenac) 
and Revelin. These forts served as points of advanced warning to the east and west of 
the city. The port and the arsenal were on the eastern side of the walls and oriented 
towards the sea. However, the port and arsenal were also located close to the center 
of the city, which allowed for direct access to the city if they were breached. Thus, 
particular defensive strategies were implemented to secure the port and the arsenal. 
A true investigation of the city’s architecture, construction methods, mainte-
nance, and repair would require an entire volume. Suffice to say that architectural 
design and construction engineering was directed toward neutralizing the danger 
of foreign invasions. Wars with Serbia, Bosnia, Venice, and Genoa served to rein-
force Dubrovnik’s impenetrability and sustain its independence in the Middle ages. 
When the Serbian King Stefan Miloutine attacked Dubrovnik in 1301, the ancient 
convents of the lower orders (on convents of the dominicans and franciscans) serve 
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as shelter for those attacking the walls.27 Half a century later, in 1366, the two con-
vents were inside the city walls.28 
In 1358 during the War of Zadar, the Councils of Dubrovnik ordered that all city 
gates be closed except the two principle gates at Pilé and Plotché, which were pro-
tected by deep moats and drawbridges. In that conflict, the destroyed buildings in 
Dubrovnik’s immediate surroundings were used as launch points of attacks. During 
the War of Chioggia (Tenedos), patrician estates and churches were razed and the 
city walls were threatened over the duration of the war. 
The fifteenth century was the period in which the greatest work was performed 
on the city walls. This was the era of the most intensive attacks of the Dukes of Bosnia 
which were followed by Ottoman threats. It was also a period of unprecedented 
wealth for Dubrovnik which allowed it to imagine bolder and more expensive 
military initiatives. In 1430 an ordinance passed to develop and expand the use 
of the city walls which stated, “this measure is enacted not to increase the city’s 
beauty, but rather its security”.29 In 1455, the tallest tower in Dubrovnik —named 
“Mintcheta” — was erected to flank the city walls. It was the work of the noted 
Florentine architect Michelozzo who believed it would form the cornerstone of 
Dubrovnik’s defense.30 The construction of the tower progressed rapidly. The walls 
were also reinforced to be an average of five meters in thickness and deep ditches 
were constructed surrounding them. All of this was a solid guarantee against a 
potential Ottoman siege. 
The amount of work involved in such endeavors is illustrated by the Mayor 
Council’s decision in 1462 to place a commanding order on all roads leading to 
Dubrovnik that “any person traveling on the road be given a stone which he would 
be required to carry to a worksite inside the city”. In the interest of fairness, it was 
added that “road supervisors are to insure that larger stones are assigned to the har-
diest men, and smaller stones to the less robust...”31 
The main source of Dubrovnik’s wealth from 1420 was the sale, trade, and 
manufacture of wool. The proliferation of wool workshops and trading houses in Du-
brovnik’s surrounding regions contributed to the city’s enrichment but also proved 
to be highly dangerous in times of war. During the 1460s, in the final stages of the 
Ottoman offensive against Bosnia, the Ottoman army used the wool workshops as 
camps and staging grounds for their offensive against the city. As prosperity could 
27. Chronica Ragusina Junii Restii...: 105. 
28. On more than one occasion, in the last centuries of the Middle Ages, the commune authorities 
sought to reinforce the urban perimeter, notably the area surrounding the two largest convents —the 
Franciscans and the Dominicans. These convents formed part of the city walls and thus were particularly 
vulnerable to attacks by outside ennemies.
29. DAD. Consilium Rogatorum, IV, f. 136v-137v.
30. DAD. Consilium Minus, XV, f. 184. The architect drew an annual salary of 240 ducats, of which 40 
ducats were advanced to him in Florence. His contract stipulated “He is to manage and supervise all work 
on the ramparts, ditches, and towers, and to order and offer guidance on the execution of plans and 
drawings, according to his will and the will of the government. Further, he is not obliged to carry out the 
construction with his own hands”.
31. DAD. Consilium Minus, XVI, f. 41v.
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not come at the expense of security, the authorities in Dubrovnik launched a mas-
sive campaign in 1463 to destroy the weavers’ workshops and stores. Artisan wool 
production, which had been brought to Dubrovnik by Tuscan master weavers and 
Catalan wool merchants, would never fully recover from the destruction. Weavers 
were found liable for the destroyed workshops, and the city authorities filled wells 
and destroyed water tanks, ensuring that life was not possible outside the city walls. 
Other extreme solutions to the heightened security problem were offered, such as 
the destruction of the city aqueduct, which had been constructed by the Neapolitan 
engineer Onofrio de la Cava. But in the end they were not carried out as the Ottoman 
threat waned and the city returned to a normal state of commerce.32 
2.2 The city arsenal
Despite being within the city walls, an essential feature of passive military defense 
was the arsenal. Unlike the walls, the port and the arsenal were spaces where the 
city’s maritime power was contained, and where protection of ships, anchors, moor-
ings, and other sea vessels was paramount. Hence, there were strict regulations con-
cerning the organization of the defense of the port and arsenal, many of which were 
part and parcel of laws concerning public order and the security of the urban zone. 
The amounts expended on construction and repair of city defenses rose 
substantially in the fourteenth century when Dubrovnik participated in two 
major maritime military coalitions. The Council decision of 1345 was of singular 
importance: to complete the construction of the wall separating the port from 
the arsenal. This was considered a crucial safeguard of the arsenal in case of the 
invasion of the port.33 In 1347 a chain was placed between the towers of St. Luke 
and St. John which connected the northernmost and southernmost points of the 
port. A pier was also constructed in the middle of the harbor during this time, which 
was intended to break up dangerous waves as well as interfere with the incursion 
of invading vessels.34 At the start of the fifteenth century, work began on a new 
arsenal that was to be closed to the port and accessible from within the city limits, 
and therefore invulnerable to maritime attacks as well as attacks from Mount Srdj, 
north of the city. 
32. DAD. Consilium Rogatorum, XVII, f. 236.
33. Monumenta. Ragusina: libri reformationum. I, ann. 1306-1347, ed. Josephus Gelcich. Zagreb: Academia 
scientiarum et artium slavorum meridionalim, 1879: 184-185.
34. Fejic, Nenad. “Construire et contrôler: le gouvernement de Dubrovnik (Raguse) face au défi de la 
construction et de la protection des infrastructures portuaires (XIV-XV siècles)”, Ports maritimes et ports 
fluviaux au Moyen âge. XXXVe Congrès de la SHMES, la Rochelle, 5 et 6 juin 204, Patrick Boucheron, ed. Paris: 
Publications de la Sorbonne, 2005: 117-125.
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3. The consolidation of public order: contributions to defense 
policy
Dubrovnik’s active port was a commercial center and a nexus of manufacturing, 
and therefore a crucial hub in the Adriatic Sea, particularly in the last two centuries 
of the Middle Ages. Still, the fourteen major international and local wars in which 
Dubrovnik was engaged represented a significant handicap to economic activity. 
The city’s residents had to continually manage the presence of foreigners in their 
homes and neighborhoods, their port, and their public spaces. The population also 
had to increase surveillance on domestic agents who would act in concert with 
foreigners against local interests, and authorities continually struggled to maintain 
order and civility in times of war. Domestic policy had the dual goal of limiting ex-
ternal threats and consolidating public order in times of war. 
Public policy surrounding public order was far more nuanced and complex than 
policy regarding civic defense. The objectives concerned each member of the popu-
lation and their relations with one another, as well as with foreigners. Governing 
elites as well as commoners were given specific roles to locate and neutralize ele-
ments of the population who could be construed as disloyal or dangerous to the 
municipality. There were those —both foreign and Ragusan— who could benefit 
from instability, insecurity, and opportunities engendered by war at the expense of 
the city. The maintenance of public order sought to check those dangers. 
Dubrovnik profited greatly from the dense population of merchants and artisans 
whose trades enriched the entire population. These skilled men often originated 
from the Balkan states of Serbia, Bosnia, Hungary, and later, the far reaches of 
the Ottoman Empire, and while Dubrovnik was aware of their economic value, 
they also feared their potentially conflicting interests. Dubrovnik was aware of how 
valuable it was to the Balkan States, who were deprived of ports, navies, and valu-
able skilled populations. These states were also dependent on Dubrovnik for the 
expansion of their own economies as the port of Dubrovnik exported the wealth of 
their gold, silver, and copper mines, as well as their trade goods such as wood, wax, 
leather, honey, silk, and livestock. The Balkan states were also dependent on Du-
brovnik’s control over the trade routes which brought weaponry, fabrics, jewelry, 
glassware, and other luxury goods which secured the status of the Balkan monar-
chies and ruling classes. 
Dubrovnik’s trade ban on merchants who wished to travel to hostile countries 
was as devastating to the city, itself as it was to the enemy kingdom. During the 
campaign against the Serbian King Vladislav in 1234, Dubrovnik banned all citi-
zens from traveling to the enemy’s territory and ordered all citizens within enemy 
territory to return at once, under penalty of deprivation of citizenship.35 The same 
order was given to merchants during the War of Tenedos in 1378. These restrictive 
measures were clearly disruptive and extremely unpopular with the merchants. 
However, the government always stood firm. 
35. Chronica Ragusina Junii Restii...: 77.
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During the War of Tenedos, all Ragusans wishing to leave the city had to seek 
permission from a Council leader. The claimant had to promise to return within a 
month’s time or face a fine. In order to increase the social pressure, the names of 
every Ragusan who departed was proclaimed by the town crier in common spaces 
so that “they would be known to all and that their obligation to return be made 
public, so that they present themselves immediately upon their return to the army 
commanders”.36 The government also preempted any attempts of its citizenry to 
escape the city without explicit permission. A measure voted in the Lower Council 
forbade the exit of any person in Dubrovnik from the city without permission under 
penalty of one ducat, and demanded it illegal to climb the city walls unless one was 
a night watchman.37 Although Dubrovnik was quite divided by social class, these 
restrictions and impositions applied equally to patricians and commoners. 
In 1301, during the attack of the King of Serbia, the inhabitants of the island 
of Mljet received government orders to “bring a sword, a shield, a helmet, and a 
sling”.38 Subsequently, in 1432, during a prolonged and arduous conflict against 
the Bosnian Duke Radoslav Pavlovic, the city authorities entrusted the keys to im-
portant defensive doors to “those serious men who lived closest to the walls” who 
could be trusted to only open the doors for the night watchmen. In the morning 
the “serious men” were charged with retrieving the keys from a patrician and com-
manding the guards, and returning the keys.39 At certain moments, the government 
was more authoritarian with the peri-urban population than the centralized urban 
population, as the outlying areas were more prone to penetration by foreigners. 
Faced with the threat posed by the presence of the powerful Ottoman fleet in 1480, 
the government authorized the inhabitants of the island of Lastavo to abandon their 
island place themselves in more protected areas “within Puglia, the Marche region, 
and in Dubrovnik proper, or seek refuge elsewhere”.40 The government then ap-
propriated all the vacated or unused homes in Dubrovnik and designated them as 
places of refuge for the citizens of the island of Lastavo, where they remained for 
the duration of the Ottoman threat.41 
Foreigners from hostile territories were not treated equitably in times of conflict, 
particularly if they were Slavs or Venetians. During the war against the Serbian 
King Stefan Miloutine between 1317 and 1318, security guards placed near the port 
were to “Publicly display a list of all aliens who entered the city carrying weapons, 
36. Odluke veca dubrovacke republike (Les Décisions des conseils de la République de Raguse), ed. Mihailo Dinic.
Belgrade: Sryska Kraljevska akademija, 1964: 89.
37. Odluke Veca dubrovacke republike...: 148.
38. Monumenta Ragusina: libri reformationum. V...: 6.
39. Who were these “serious men”, who carried out such specific functions and responsibilities? 
Historians have not found any references to their status or membership in the Patrician class. They could 
have well been from the class of ordinary citizens, and thus excluded entirely from government posts or 
the military command.
40. DAD. Consilium Minus, XXI, f. 144v.
41. DAD. Consilium Minus, XXI, f. 144v.
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so that they be approached to surrender their arms before entering the city walls”.42 
If a foreigner was caught smuggling weapons inside the city walls, he was fined one 
ducat per day, and two and a half ducats per night of his crime. Carrying weapons 
at night was punished by immediate confiscation. This last order was proclaimed “in 
sclavonesca lingua” by the town crier. During the duration of the war, the Lower 
Council demanded that a register be created of all the Slavs resident in Dubrovnik 
who would serve the town, “so that individuals could be punished or rewarded, as 
was their due, and no one could boast of evil deeds”.
The Councils also desired to establish powerful deterrents against foreigners 
acting as double agents.43 In 1330, when the city was replete with mercenaries, a 
radical measure was passed by the High Council whereby a commission of five pa-
tricians was established that was authorized to “act by any means necessary to act 
in the best consideration and good of the city and eliminate and kill any individual 
who could be a threat to Dubrovnik”.44 Sometimes, such measures had a particular 
individual as a target. During the war against the Bosnian Duke Stefan Vuktchitch 
Kossatcha between 1451 and 1454, the town took advantage of the gesture made 
earlier in peacetime whereby the Duke was granted Ragusan citizenship and passed 
the extreme but symbolic measure to accuse him of treason and put a price on his 
head. While it was largely a symbolic act, it had a strong effect on the duke, who 
temporarily interrupted his siege of the city.45 
The urban common not only prohibited its citizens from traveling to hostile 
territories, but also placed restrictions on travel for foreigners from these regions. 
Measures often included harassment and detention of these individuals. Prominent 
Venetian merchants who were welcomed and warmly treated by the Ragusan elite 
in peacetime found themselves victimized, persecuted, imprisoned, or expelled 
during the War of Tenedos. Foreigners were not the only victims of such xenopho-
bia. Ragusans’ everyday activities were also policed in the name of securing urban 
harmony. All public traffic and commerce was restricted and observed, particularly 
at night, where it was often banned entirely. On several occasions in wartime Du-
brovnik, the city prohibited any resident aliens as well as Ragusans to go out of 
doors without a lantern after the third bell. After this time, innkeepers were also 
prohibited from serving wine to their customers, unless they were night watchmen, 
who could be served at any hour. There were also other bizarre restrictions such 
as those made in 1330 where individuals were “forbidden to walk the town in dis-
guise, especially in the disguise of a Jew, in possession of offensive weapons, sticks, 
or stones, punishable under the statute”.46 
42. Monumenta Ragusina: libri reformationum. V...: 117r.
43. Monumenta Ragusina: libri reformationum. II, ann. 1347-1352, ed. Franjo Racki. Zagreb: L. Hartman, 
1882: 303.
44. Monumenta Ragusina: libri reformationum. II...: 326. 
45. Chronica Ragusina Junii Restii...: 319-320.
46. Liber Statutorum civitatis Ragusii compositus anno 1272, ed. Bogisic Valtazar, Jirecek Konstantin. Zagreb: 
Societas typographica, 1904. 
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Additionally, during wartime, the ruling elite had reason to be fearful of 
commoners. Artisans’ apprentices, sailors, servants, and the underclass had much 
to gain and little to lose from disruptions to order. These individuals aroused the 
suspicions of the patricians and measures were often taken against them. As in 
Venice, where the rule of the oligarchy was tested several times throughout the 
Middle Ages, the social order of Dubrovnik was not immune from threats. Liberty and 
liberal political organization which had thrived in peacetime was a potential threat 
in wartime. It was well known that outside enemies could promptly take advantage 
of the dissatisfied or disenfranchised classes and sow chaos in a city. According to 
historical chronicles of Dubrovnik, when the city was attacked by the Serbian King 
Stefan Ouros in 1275, “the King, having been counseled by confidante, would not 
sign the peace treaty ending the war as long as the Ragusans retained a Venetian 
count as part of the government. They were ordered to replace the Venetian with 
a minister of the Serbian king which would guarantee Dubrovnik’s subservience to 
Serbia, rather than another territory”.47 
Another example is drawn from the time immediately preceding the attack of the 
Bosnian king when four young patricians sought to overturn the public order of the 
city of Dubrovnik in 1401. In the historical sources, these men are accused of “prac-
ticing shameful customs and leading an infamous a way of life, which distinguished 
them from other patricians as they were so disreputable.” These young patricians 
entered into an agreement with a foreign leader (most likely the King of Bosnia) 
in order to gain power for themselves at the expense of the political establishment. 
They were discovered by the authorities along the city walls exchanging letters, 
which were immediately seized. The conspirators confessed their crime and were 
quickly beheaded.48 The citizens of the city later learned that the four patrician turn-
coats had, in addition to support from a foreign leader, the promise of assistance 
from two hundred inhabitants of humble origin of ther district of Konavli.49 It was 
particularly concerning that the conspiracies were conceived by members of the pa-
trician class, who were considered to be faithful supporters of the established order. 
Ironically, though, the ordinary citizens, merchants, craftsmen, apprentices, and 
servants aroused a greater degree of mistrust in wartime. Council records indicate 
that these members of the underclass were placed under heavy surveillance and 
restrictions, despite having pledged their loyalty and friendship to Dubrovnik on 
several occasions. 
In the mid-fourteenth century, Dubrovnik increasingly diversified its military 
capacities and sought the specialization of its armed forces for either the main-
tenance of public order within the city walls or the defense of the ramparts and 
walls. This specialization of forces occurred gradually with the emergence of the 
urban night police which was responsible for enforcing the Statute and the deci-
sions of the Councils. These special contingents were recruited from among the 
47. Chronica Ragusina Junii Restii...: 96.
48. Annales Ragusini anonymi item Nicolai de Ragnina...: 242-243.
49. DAD, Liber Maleficiorum, I, 13r-14v.
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urban populace and were responsible for the night patrols. They were known as 
the “domini de nocte” and were comprised of roughly thirty men —two shifts 
of eight men in groups of four. In addition to urban patrols, they monitored the 
entrances to the port located between the towers of Saint Luke and Saint John as 
well as the Pilé door. The night police were commanded by a “capitaneus noctis” 
who was a patrician. 
4. Conclusion
This work has endeavored to illustrate the city of Dubrovnik in times of war during 
the Late Middle Ages. The city was composed of an urban collective that was joined 
to a rural complex governed by an elite patrician class through three councils. The 
ruling class constituted a small minority of the population and commoners (cives de 
populo) as well as foreigners comprised the remainder of the urban and peri-urban 
populace. These common individuals were ruled by the urban statutes governing the 
urban civilians (habitatores), which conferred on them few rights. Merchants, labor-
ers, artisans, and slaves all contributed to the city’s defense, however. 
Study of Dubrovnik’s defense policy in wartime cannot be limited to research 
concerning military order or strategy or the practice of defense. It must encom-
pass an analysis of urban governance and civic identity which shaped the character 
of the urban collective and how it orchestrated great measures for the preserva-
tion of Dubrovnik. The historian must draw out the lived experiences of the “silent 
majority” which constituted the non-patrician class in medieval Dubrovnik. 
Assuredly, the maintenance of public order in times of war or peace rested in 
the hands of the patrician class. This group congregated in the Senate (Consilium 
Rogatorum), the High Council, and the Lower Council to enact policies that affected 
every individual in society. It is important to note, though, that the ruling class’ at-
titudes toward and relationships with commoners were not entirely marked by fear 
and distrust. Patrician commanders of militias were forced to interact with com-
moners for prolonged periods of time in difficult conditions, making complex rela-
tionships possible across class and ethnic divides. All citizens were put to work for 
the greater good of the social collective and the physical structure of the city. Certain 
individuals were chosen to guard the port and the arsenal at the entrance to the 
city proper. Perhaps this role was assigned to those whose origins made them more 
likely to be aware of delinquents, marauders, or enemies of the city, and therefore 
more effective guards? It is clear that throughout Dubrovnik’s history, specific ca-
pacities and functions were certainly assigned to particular social groups to ensure 
specialization of military tasks. Dubrovnik’s all-encompassing social strategy for the 
maintenance of ideal self-defense deserves greater historical research. 
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